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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy May 9, 1978 
RE: No. 77-1134, Montana v. United States 
L}fof.i," -h AffirfYI_./ 
The SG has filed a 13-page ros~nie, which is a~ 
in itself that there may be something here. The response 
addresses the England/collateral estoppel point and the 
Supremacy Clause issue on the merits. 
1. England/collateral estoppel. The SG argues first 
that England is inapplicable because the conditions for 
imposition of that doctrine are inapplicable. According to 
the SG, those mnditions are: (1) the federal court has 
abstained, (2) the parties asserting the federal claim "freely 
2. 
and without reservation" submit their federal claims to the 
state courts, (3) the parties in both actions are identical, 
and (4) the state court has jurisdiction over the parties. 
The SG submits that these conditions were not met because 
the federal court technically did not abstain, but held its 
proceedings in abeyance pending completion of the state court 
proceedings in Kiewit; the United States never agreed to submit 
its federal claims to the state courts; the state court never 
acquired jurisdiction over the United States; and the United 
States was not a party to Kiewit. On the collateral estoppel 
point, the SG argues that the deciSion in Kiewit did not decide 
the issue here. According to the SG, xkex«8RX it was not clear 
that Kiewit would have to pay any gross receipts tax because 
the tax might have been cancelled out by the other tax 
credits (personal property and corporate income). 
9 I think the SG probably is right about England, but 
~ ~ I have-~ut t~ coll_:ter:=, estoppel_:,oint. It is 
~ true that the Montana S. Ct. in Kiewit I said that the xaxx 
gross receipts tax might end up in a "washout", but in 
Kiewit II it seems that the contractor argued that it might 
indeed f have to pay a net tax and that therefore the tax 
was invalid, because it amounted to a revenue-raising, rather 
than a revenue-enforcing, measure. (As noted in the preliminary 
memo, the state court rejected this argument in Kiewit II.) 
In addition, even if the identical issue was not litigated 
in Kiewit I as in the federal proceedings below, the United 
States would seem to be bound by the state court determination 
3. 
that the distinction in the Montana tax between public and 
private contractors is not violative of the equal protection 
clause. Whether or not this equal protection determination 
is determinative of the discrimination issue under the 
Supremacy Clause is an open question, as far as I can tell, 
answer to the 
but the/collateral estoppel issue is not clear to me. 
2. The Supremacy Clause issue. The SG's argument, in 
essence, is that the gross receipts tax is discriminatory 
against the federal government because:(l) The tax applies only 
to public contractors, and therefore it is not like the 
neutral, across-the-board taxes imposed in cases like 
Alabama v. King & Boozer or James v. Dravo Contracting (both 
cited in the preliminary memo). The taxes imposed in those 
cases "are imposed equally on all similarly situated con-
stituents--private as well as governmental--in the state. The 
tax involved here is not." Motion to Affirm 10. According 
to the SG, the omission of private contractors is critical 
because if the tax were imposed on private contractors, 
there would be constitutents in the state who could protest 
to the legislature if the tax became too high. Here, on the 
other hand, the tax applies only to those who deal with 
federal 
the/government and state and local governments. That brings 
me to the SG's second point: (2) Although the tax appears 
contractors dealing with 
to be neutral because it applies to/state and local entities 
as well as the federal government, this is only superficially 
the case. The state can reimburse its contractors for the 
4. 
taxes (as can the federal government), but with the state, 
the money goes from one pocket (the contracting office) to 
the other (the tax collector). The same is not true of the 
fedearal government. 
While the SG is correct that the ixxHe tax here 
( 
is not like the ones upheld,xkexe which applied a«sxx 
across-the-board to ~Hkii£ contractors or lessees dealing 
with public and private entities alike, neither is the tax -as clearly discriminatory as the SG makes it out to be. -
The tax applies not only to contractors who deal with the 
federal government, but also contractors who deal with 
local governments. These latter governments do not get 
back their money the same way the state does, and in that 
respect are situated just like the federal government. XR 
aaaixiSR~ Unless they are reimbursed by the state, which 
does not appear to be the case, they provide the political 
check on the state's taxing power required to sustain the tax. 
The SG does not provide an adequate answer to this point. 
He merely says, in a footnote: 
"The fact that the tax is imposed on receipts from 
local governments, school districts and other govern-
mental entities makes no difference, even assuming 
that those entities, like the federal government, 
cannot recoup those payments occasioned by the tax. 
Once it is shown that the State is discriminating 
against the federal government, the tax must fall; 
its constitutionality cannot be restored by showing 
that the state is also discriminating against other 
governmental entitities." 
Motion to Affirm 10. This statement begs the question whether 
the tax does discriminate against the federal government; and 
). 
the state maintains that the fact tha·t other governmental 
entities also are subject to the tax proves non-discrimination. 
The question, then, is whether the added protection 
that would be afforded the federal government if the tax also 
were imposed on contractors deaing with private entities is 
constitutionally required if the tax is not to violate the 
Supremacy Clause. I still think this is a substantial federal 
question. Certainly, for basic equal protection purposes 
involving state taxation, the distinction between private 
and public contractors would pass constitutional muster. 
The question here is whether a higher standard is applicable 
when the gsx federal government contends that the failure to 
include private contractors in the tax xdemonstrates 
discrimination against the federal government. See preliminary 
memo at iix 9-10. 
One final word: the SG relies heavily on United States 
v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977), for the proposition 
that the tax is invalid because it is not applied across-the-board 
to private as well as public contractors. In County of Fresno, 
California imposed a tax on lessees of tax-exempt public 
property, and this applied to persons who rented xaxKexx 
tax-exempt houses from the National Forest Service. The 
Court sustained the tax. But the SG argues that the reason 
the Court sustained the tax was because it corresponded to 
the tax imposed on the owners of private property (which was 
not tax-exempt), which presumbably was reflected in the rent 
Sec. 'ia1 u.s. ~i, 'I~~ . 
paid by these private lessees. G therefore reasons that 
this other tax provided the "political check against abuse" 
required by the Supremacy Clause. (Xn ·addition, I note that 
Tyler recommended to you in his bench memo that the tax 
was oNay in part because it represented an attempt to 
even up the relative positions of those renting from owners 
of tax-exempt property and those renting from owners of 
taxed property.) Here, on the other ak hand, private 
contracoors are totally excluded from the tax. 
While County of Fresno thus is instructive, I do not 
-----think it is dispositive of this case for several reasons. 
For what it's warth, that case involved taxing federal 
employees' possessory interest in federal property, k whereas 
this involves a direct tax on the gross receipts of the 
contracoor himself. But because the tax is on the work the 
contracoor does for the federal government, and because in 
many instances the government will reimburse the taxp?yer, 
I doubt that that makes a constitutional difference. The 
more important distinction between the cases is that here 
at least the tax is imposed on la£al contractors who do 
business with local governments as well as those who do 
business with the state and the federal government. That 
may be sufficient to make the tax nondiscriminatory, but I 
am not sure. Contrary to appellants' coneantions and the 
opinim of the dissenting judge below, however, it seems to 
me likely that if the tax weee imposed only on those who do 
business with the state and the federal governments, the 
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1. SUMMARY: The main question presented by this 
appeal is whether a state-imposed gross receipts tax on 
contractors who perform work for public bodies, including 
the federal government, is unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause. Subordinate issues are whether 
imposition of a tax on public contractors but not private 
contractors violates the equal protection clause, and 
~. 
whether the federal three-judge court was precluded from 
considering these issues because of a prior state court 
adjudication. 
2. FACTS: Appellants are the State of Montana, 
the Montana Dep't of Revenue, and the Department's Director 
(all hereinafter referred to as Montana or appellants). 
Montana imposes a tax of 1% on gross receipts of public 
contractors, which are defined to be construction -
contractors performing work for any public body, including 
the State, any of its political subdivisions or special 
purpose districts, and the federal government. It appears 
that the tax originally was conceived as a "revenue 
enforcing", rather than as a "revenue raising" measure. 
The gross receipts tax would be collected from public 
contractors and held, sort of as security, for the 
contractor's personal property and corporate income taxes 
that eventually would become due. The contractor receives 
a refund or credit toward the personal property and 
corporate income taxes. The State apparently keeps 
whatever is left over, however, and so the tax acts in part 
as a revenue raising measure. 
This litigation began in state court when the 
federal government, on behalf of the Army Corps of 
Engineers, directed one of its contractors (Kiewit) to 
challenge the Montana tax on equal protection and supremacy 
clause grounds. Kiewit brought suit in state court. The 
suit was controlled and financed by the federal 
------------------~ ~-----------------~ 
3. 
government. Kiewit lost in state court. Kiewit Sons, Inc. 
v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140 (1973) 
(Kiewit I) (contained in the J.S. App. 105-123). The 
Montana S. Ct. rejected all the challenges to the tax law. 
The following holdings are relevant to this case: (1) The 
distinction between private contractors, who are not 
subject to the tax, and public contractors, who are, is not 
irrational under the equal protection clause in view of the 
wide latitude given the states in enacting taxing 
statutes. (The reasons given by the state court for the 
distinction did not seem to have anything to do with 
taxation; they seemed to be related more to the need for 
licensing and regulation of contractors who perform work 
for public bodies.) (2) The tax is not an 
unconstitutional discrimination against the federal 
government because contractors who deal with the federal 
government are not treated less favorably than contractors 
who deal with the State. (3) The impact of the tax on the 
federal government is not direct or substantial. All of 
these rulings added up to the conclusion that the tax is 
not unconstitutional under this Court's precedents. 
In Kiewit Sons, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 531 
P.2d 1327 (1975) (Kiewit II) (contained in J.S. App. 
124-30), the Montana S. Ct. rejected Kiewit's contention 
that the statute was invalid when used as a 
revenue-producing measure instead of a revenue-enforcing 
measure. 
3. 
During the pendency of these state court 
proceedings, an action that had been filed by the federal 
government to challenge the tax was continued pursuant · to ~~ 
the parties' agreement~e; Kiewit I and--Kiewit II, the
majority of the three-judge court below ruled that the tax 
is invalid under the Supremacy Clause. First, it rejected 
Montana's contention that relitigation of the 
constitutionality of the tax was barred by res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, or the rule of England v. Louisiana 
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (holding that 
a party that submits its federal claims for decisions by a 
state court, without reservation, forgoes the right to 
return to dist ct even if it did not seek review of the 
state court decision in this Court) . 
On the merits, and in a fairly confusing opinion, 
the majority held that the tax violates the Supremacy 
Clause by discriminating against the federal government and 
in favor of the state. The supposed discrimination occurs 
because although contractors who work for both the State 
and the federal government have to pay the tax, and thereby 
the cost to the contracting government is made higher, the 
State gets its money back in the form of general revenues 
while the federal government does not. 
While first stating that its resolution of the 
Supremacy Clause issue made it unnecessary to pass upon the 
question whether the equal protection clause prohibits the 
State's discrimination between public and private 
contractors, the court went on to state its views on the 
issue anyway. First it stated that it was not barred by 
collateral estoppel from reaching the issue, despite the 
prior resolution of the question by the Montana S. Ct. The 
majority explained: "[N]othing in the issues presented, 
nor did the contractor Kiewit have standing to raise on 
behalf of the Government in Kiewit, the Government's 
current issue of the discriminatory effect upon it as an 
owner-builder by the imposition of [the tax] upon its 
[c]ontractors in violation of the Supremacy Clause." J.S. 
App. 15. On the merits of this issue the court concluded 
that "as between [public contractors] and large structure 
private contractors, there is no reasonable or rational 
factual basis for the demonstrated unequal treatment under 
the Act." Id. 16. Apparently by reading the equal 
protection clause together with the Supremacy Clause, the 
majority concluded that "the imposition of the [gross 
receipts] tax upon [public contractors] discriminates 
against the Government in favor of private contractors, all 
in violation of the Supremacy Clause." Id. 17. 
Judge Kilkenny dissented on every point. He 
believed these issues to have been determined conclusively 
by the prior state court adjudication. The United States 
admitted the following facts indicating that it had control 
over the lawsuit: the federal government required Kiewit 
to file the lawsuit; reviewed and approved the complaint; 
paid the attorneys fees; directed the appeal to the Montana 
b. 
s. Ct.; participated as amicus curiae before that court; 
was the real party in interest; directed the filing of a 
notice of appeal to this Court; and, through the SG, 
abandoned its appeal here. In view of these facts, Judge 
Kilkenny believed that the federal government had the 
"laboring oar" in the state court proceeding and therefore 
should be bound by it. Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 
316, 318. 
On the merits, he suggested that the majority's 
decision sub silentio overruled a whole line of this 
Court's cases allowing States to impose gross receipts 
taxes on contractors even when they worked for the federal 
government. See,~., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 
1; James v. Dravo Contracting, 302 U.S. 134. The 
majority's reasoning--that this was discrimination against 
the federal government and in favor of the State~ simply 
because the State got back its contracting money in the 
form of general revenues--would apply to every tax on 
contractors' gross receipts because the same work performed 
for the federal government would not be as expensive when 
performed for the State. The majority's reasoning distorts 
the proper test, as set out in Phillips Chemical Co. v. 
Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, that the State must treat 
those who deal with the federal government as well as it 
treats those with whom it deals itself. Id., at 385. Here 
that test was met because the tax itself is identical as 
applied to contractors working for the federal government 
7. 
and contractors working for the State. The only difference 
is in the impact on the sovereign,. and 'at that point there 
is no Supremacy Clause violation because the tax itself is 
the same regardless of whether the sovereign is the State 
or the federal government, and any economic effect on the 
federal government is neither direct nor substantial. 
On the issue concerning the difference in 
treatment of public and private contractors, Judge Kilkenny 
concluded that the issue had been decided in the State's 
favor in Kiewit I and that, in any event, the majority's 
resolution of the question was wrong. The States have wide 
latitude in drawing distinctions for purposes of taxation; 
the fact that the Supremacy Clause is implicated does not 
change that standard of review. Rather, the federal 
government's interest "must be weighed in the balance to 
ascertain whether the state treats similarly-situated 
constituents in a similar fashion. [T]his condition 
is satisfied here in that all contractors are subject to 
the same exact tax." J.S. App. 33. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants attack the reasoning 
of the majority on each of the above points, including 
whether the dist ct was precluded from considering these 
questions. On the merits, appellants contend that the 
lower court majority has completely misinterpreted Phillips 
Chemical. In concluding that the tax is discriminatory 
because the State gets its payment back in the for~ of 
general revenue, the lower court implicitly overruled many 
8 . 
of this Court's cases upholding state taxes on contractors 
working for the federal government. S~e cases cited at 
J.S. 15. (Appellants also note that while the State ·itself 
will get its money back, the same will not be true of 
political subdivisions and other units that hire public 
contractors.) According to appellants, Ph~llips Chemical 
simply requires that the tax applied to contractors dealing 
with the federal government be the same as the tax applied 
to contractors dealing with the State. (In Phillips the 
tax itself was different as applied to property leased by 
the federal government or the State.) The fact that the 
tax here distinguishes between public and private 
contractors only is relevant to the equal protection 
question. 
Appellants' position, in sum, is: 
"A tax must pass two separate 'discrimination' 
tests. As with any tax the classification between 
those who actually pay the tax and those who are 
excluded must be non-discriminatory under equal 
protection standards. And where a tax also has 
some inter-sovereign overtones, the tax must also 
be non-discriminatory in that it treats those 
taxpayers who deal with the Federal Government as 
well as it treats those who deal with the State." 
J.S. 18. The lower court majority has "greatly confused 
the law • . • by holding that a Supremacy test must be made 
not only of the relationship created by the taxing act 
between the two sovereigns but also that a Supremacy test 
(rather than an Equal Protection test) is also made of the 
actual classification for tax purposes between those taxed 
and those exempt." J.S. 20. 
Appellants' arguments are echoed in two amicus 
briefs--one from California and one filed jointly by 
Virginia, Arizona, North Dakota, Alaska, Nebraska, 
Maryland, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Alabama, Wyoming, Guam, 
Washington, Arkansas, Florida, West Virginia, Iowa, Idaho, 
New Mexico, Indiana, Puerto Rico, and Colorado. They are 
all very upset with the decision below. 
4. DISCUSSION: In view of the reaction of the 
States who are ~mici, the opinion of the dissenting judge, 
the lack of coherence in the decision below, and the 
apparent departure from this Court's precedents, it would 
be hard to say that there is not a substantial federal __ ....,'--""" 
question here. -----.... .. . . -This clearly is not a case like Phillips 
Chemical, where the tax itself differed depending on 
whether the federal government or the State was involved. 
9. 
The only way to say that there is discrimination ·here is to 
focus on the fact that when the State pays a contractor a 
higher price because of the contractor's tax liability, it 
gets back the extra funds through the tax, while the 
federal government does not. But appellants, the amici, 
and the dissenting judge seem to be right that this would ) 
I ( pvblic. ar,d pri vafe / 
be true with any tax levied on all contractor1 1 
This latter point may be what impelled the court 
below to examine the exemption of private contractors from 
the tax; for the exemption makes this tax look like more 
like the tax in Phillips Chemical, which applied only to 
those who dealt with the federal government and the State, 
10. 
yet the State got its money back. The court below may have 
been attempting to see whether the tax .structure really is 
a facade for discriminating against contractors who deal 
with the federal government. But there is much to what 
appellants say about the confusion ]n the decision below of 
the equal protection and Supremacy Clause tests. In 
addition, political subdivisions of the State receive the 
same tax treatment as the federal government. 
I would call for a response from the SG. There is 
no response. 
Bregstein Opns in petn 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
Suhmitted ................ , 19 . . . 
/ 
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BENCH ' MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: Montana · v~ ·united ·states, No. 77-1134 
summary 
This case arises out of a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Montana Contractors' Gross Receipts 
Tax Act (the Act). The Act levies a 1% tax on the gross 
receipts from "public contracts," defined to include all 
-....__ ______..... ----- '--.. 
contracts for public construction work in the State with the 
State of Montana, its subdivisions, and the United States. The ,, ,, 
Act imposes no tax on gross receipts from private contracts, ---- ----i~e~, contracts with private Purchasers of construction work. 
The Act provides for refunds and credits of the gross receipts 
tax, based on the payment of Montana personal property tax, 
personal income tax, and corporate license tax. These refunds 
and credits reduce the effective rate of the gross receipts tax 
to one half of 1%. 
The Act also establishes a system for licensing and 
regulation of contractors who enter into public contracts. 
Though in the following discussion I will use the 
terms "public contractor" and "private contractor" for facility 
of expression, it should be borne in mind that a contractor may 
perform both public and private contracts. The gross receipts 
tax is levied on the receipts from all public contracts. -----------------~~t qu~resent~by this case is whether 
the United States is precluded from litigating its claim that 
the Act is unconstitutional. The answer to this question turns 
on the effect to be given to a prior iudgment of the Montana 
Supreme Court. This question is discussed in Part I. 
If the United States is not precluded from bringing 
this action, then the Court must reach the merits of its claim 
that the Act is unconstitutional. This claim, as presented by 
the SG, rests on the Supremacy Clause alone, though an equal 
protection challenge to the Act has been mentioned at various 
stages of this litigation and the prior state court litigation. 
The constitutionality of the Act is discussed in Part II. 
I • Th~ R~s · JudiCata ISSU~ 
By stipulation of 
DC were continued pending the decision of another case rai~ 
similar issues in the Montana Supreme Court,~t · so2i)v~~ 
St~ Bd~ ·of Equalization, 505 P.2d 102 (1973) ("K~w~it I, 
reprinted at pp. 105-23 of the Appendix to the Jurisdictional 
Statement). The complaint in the DC was filed less than a 
month after the filing of the complaint in K~w~it · I. The State 
maintains that the two complaints raised the same 
constitutional issues, that the United States controlled the 
litigation in K~w~it I, and that the United States submitted 
its constitutional claims unreservedly in that case and had 
them determined. Accordingly, the State contends, the United 
States was barred from relitigatinq its constitutional claims 
in the DC, under the rule laid down in Enqland · v~ · Louisiana 
M~dical Examin~rs, 375 u.s. 411 (1964). 
The State also contends that even if England does not 
apply, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the United 
States from relitigating in the present action those specific 
issues that were decided in K~w~it · I. Unfortunately, the State 
does not define with any precision what it thinks those issues 
were. From its citations to the K~w~it · r decision, I would 
judqe that the State claims that the Montana court ruled on the 
claim that the Act discriminates unlawfully between the United 
States and private purchasers of contractors' services. (See 
discussion of Equal Protection claim, infra.) Referring to the 
same passage in the opinion of the Montana court, the State 
also contends that the court ruled on the claim that the 
distinction drawn between public and private contractors is 
unlawful. (See discussion of Equal Protection claim, infra.) 
Finally, without referring to any part of the State court 
decision, the State maintains that the Supremacy Clause claim 
was also determined adversely to the United States. 
The SG contends that the Enqland doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. He argues that Enqland governs only 
where 
"(1) the federal court abstains and 
sends the parties to state court for a 
resolution of state law grounds, (2) 
those parties 'freely and without 
reservation' litigate all their claims 
in the state courts, (3) the parties in 
the federal and state courts are 
identical, and (4) the state court has 
competent jurisdiciton over the 
parties." 
According to the SG, these conditions were not met in the 
present case. 
First, the DC did not invoke the doctrine of 
abstention; rather, the parties stipulated to a continuance. 
And the stipulation merely recites that the action is continued 
pending the resolution of Keweit I. Second, the SG insists -
that the United States was not a party to the Keweit · r ac ion, 





The SG responds to the State's collateral estoppel ~ 
claim by contending that the facts in this case and Keweit~~ 
are significantly different. There a particular contract 
between the United States and a contractor was considered; a 
provision of that contract forbade the contractor to claim the 
credits and refunds available against the gross receipts tax. 
That provision is no longer included in public contracts let by 
the United States, according to the SG. The SG also claims 
that the facts in Keweit · r were significantly different because 
the contractor's large inventory of equipment in Montana led 
the Montana court to assume that all of the gross receipts tax 
would be refunded or credited to the contractor on account of 
other taxes paid. In contrast, according to the SG, the record 
in the present case establishes that taken overall, the 
effective rate of taxation on contracts let by the United 
States will be one-half of 1 % of the gross receipts of the 
contractor. 
The Enqland doctrine is nothing more than the 
application of standard res judicata rules in the context of 
~ .......... 
abstention. If a party is sent to state court by an abstaining 
~·· 
federal court, and once there elects to litigate all of his 
claims and have them determined by the State court, then that 
party may not avoid an adverse determination of his federal 
claims. In particular, he cannot relitigate those claims in 
the federal court. Enqland, 375 u.s. at 418-19. In the 
present case, since there was no abstention, it would only be 
confusing to invoke the England rule; simple application of the 
rules of res judicata will fit the situation more precisely. 
The United States controlled the litigation in Keweit 
!' and was the real party in interest in that litigation. In 
~~------------------------------
response to the State's request for admissions in the DC, the 
United States admitted that it required Keweit to file the suit 
in state court, that it reviewed and approved the complaint, 
that it paid the attorneys' fees and costs, that it directed 
the appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, that it was the real 
party in interest, that it directed the filing of a notice of 
appeal to this Court, and that the appeal to this Court was 
aborted at the instance of the SG. 
It is next necessary to consider whether the United 
States should be considered to have pursued the same cause of 
action in Keweit · r as it now pursues in the present action. 
The complaint in Keweit · I sought a declaration that the hct is 
unconstitutional, and a refund of taxes paid by Keweit under 
the Act. In particular, it alleged that the Act discriminates 
illegally against the United States and those with whom it does 
business, in violation of the rights to due process and equal 
protection; that the Act discriminates against public 
contractors because no tax is imposed on private contractors; 
and that the Act "illegally violate[sl the immunity of the 
Federal Government and its instruments (including [Keweit]) 
U-~r tA---~ 
~ ~-<~--c..<:-':( c::z.<..-~ 
~ ~ £iiEe;;F-~~-<..4.., 
'---~~u-1 
from state control in the performance of t l'}.eir _Lunctions". ..~-__, 
~'1_.5~ r-;c.- ... 
In the DC, the amended complaint sought a declaration 
that the Act is unconstitutional, an injunction against its 
enforcement, and a refund of all net proceeds of the gross 
receipts tax received by the State from contractors doing 
business with the United States. The complaint alleged that 
the Act is unconstitutional because it discriminates against 
the United States in violation of the Supremacy Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment; because it discriminates between public 
and private contractors; and because it discriminates between 
• the United States and private purchasers of contracting 
services. 
The gravamen of both the state court suit and the suit 
in the DC was the prayer that the Act be declared 
--------------~----------
unconstitutional, and that appropriate refunds be paid. It is --true that in the DC action, the United States sought refund of 
all net proceeds of the gross receipts taxes paid by its 
contractors, while in the state court action it sought only the 
taxes paid by Keweit. And in the state court action, the 
United States did not seek an injunction against enforcement of 
the Act. 
Despite these differences, it seems to me that it 
would be sensible to conclude that the United States is 
asserting the same cause of actio here that it asserted in 
-----~= .... 
Keweit I. The claim asserted by the United States in both 
-----
actions was its right to be free of the Act because of the 
Act's repugnance to the Constitution. A holding in Keweit I 
that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to public contracts 
of the United States would have resulted in refunds of all 
taxes paid by contractors on business done with the United 
States, and not just refunds of Keweit's taxes. Further, it is 
up to a plaintiff to claim all damages due under a given cause 
of action in a single lawsuit. 
Nor do I think that there are any differences in the 
facts in the two cases that would support the conclusion that 
the United States is asserting a separate cause of action. 
Contrary to the SG's assertion, the State court did not 
conclude that Keweit's other tax payments would fully offset 
its qross receipts tax. This seems clear from the court's 
opinion, and was stated explicitly in the court's decision in 
Keweit . II. 1 It is true, 
1. Some six months after the decision in Keweit · I, Keweit 
filed another complaint. It alleged that 1n Keweit I, the 
court had decided that the gross receipts tax is constitutional 
only if it results in no net revenue for the State. Keweit 
claimed that since it had become obvious that the qross 
receipts tax did produce net revenue for the State, the Act 
should be declared unconstitutional. 
In Keweit II, the court rejected this suggestion, 
commenting tfiat KeweTt had read its first opinion "much too 
narrowly." The court agreed with the trial court that the 
second action was barred by "doctrines of res iudicata, 
collateral estoppel or stare decisis." The opinion in Keweit 
II is reprinted at pp. 124-30 of the App. to the Juris. 
"Statement. 
as the SG states, that the Montana court noticed the clause in 
Keweit's contract with the United States that barred Keweit 
from taking advantage of the refunds and credits available 
against the gross receipts tax. The Uniten States has since 
begun to allow its contractors to use the available offsets. 
This difference in the facts, however, seems to me to cut 
against the SG's claim that Keweit I should not be controlling 
. •. 
here. Since Keweit's contractual incapacity to take advantage 
of these offsets increased the effective net rate of taxation 
to the full one percent, it further exacerbated the unequal 
treatment of which the United States complains. Therefore, any 
differences in the facts in Keweit I would seem to have made it 
a stronger case for the United States than the present one. 
One additional aspect of the doctrine of res judicata 
(and collateral estoppel) should be noticed. An action for a 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of a state statute that 
fails at one time may well succeed at a later time if there are 
intervening changes in this Court's construction of the 
relevant constitutional provisions. This possibility should be 
taken into account in fashioning the rule of res judicata to 
govern the government's prosecution of successive actions aimed 
at voiding the same state statute. An analogous problem was 
presented in comm'r · v~ sunnen, 333 u.s. 591 (1948). 
In that case, T had entered into several contracts to 
license the use of patents that he held. Under each contract 
l 
the licensee agreed to pay royalties. One of the contracts was 
entered into in 1928: others, identical in all important 
I 
respects, were entered into later. ! assigned the contracts to 
his wife as a gift. The Comm'r brought an action before the 
Board of Tax Appeals claiming that the income from the 1928 
contract for 1929-1931 was taxable toT: the BTA decided 
against the Comm'r in 1935. In a subsequent proceeding, the 
Comm'r made the same claim with respect to the income from all 
of the contracts for the years 1937-1941. Except with respect 
to the 1928 contract, the Court refused to hold that the Comm's 
was bound by the prior decision of the BTA. The Court stated 
that the principle of collateral estoppel "is designed to 
prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been 
decided and which have remained substantially static, factually 
and legally." Id., at 599. Changes in the applicable legal 
rules made by decisions of the Court in the years between the 
Comm'r's two suits, the Court held, precluded barring the 
Comm'r from pursuing his claim in the second suit. 
The SG does not suggest, however, that there were any 
significant changes in the law of immunity under the Supremacy 
Clause, or in the relevant Equal Protection doctrines, between 
the the decisions of the Montana court in the Keweit cases and 
the decision of the DC in the present case. The only basis for 
such a claim would be the decision of this court in united 
states · v~ ·county ·of Fresno, 429 u.s. 452 (1977). I discuss the 
Fresno case infra, in reviewing the merits of the claim that 
the Act is unconstitutional; as you will see from that 
discussion, I do not regard Fresno as working any significant 
change in the law of immunity under the Supremacy Clause. 
Under traditional notions of res judicata, the 
assertion by the United States of the same cause of action in 
the state court that it now asserts in this case would bar its 
relitigation of that cause of action. This would be true even 
if the United States supported its claim in the DC with 
theories of the unconstitutionality of the Act that it did not 
present to the Montana court in Keweit · r. It also appears, 
however, that the United States presented not only the same 
cause of action but also the same theories of 
unconstitutionality in the Montana court. 
The Montana court first treated the Keweit · r case as 
raising equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The court concluded that there was no constitutional impediment 
to imoosing a tax on the gross receipts of public contracts but 
not on the gross receipts of private contracts. App. to J.S., 
at 117-18. Its reasoning appears to have been that since the 
State has good reason to license and regulate contractors in 
their dealings with public bodies, it is fair to tax those 
dealings differently than purely private dealings. As to "the 
second half of the discrimination question raised by [Keweit] ," 
the court concluded that the tax does not discriminate against 
the United States in favor of private customers of construction 
contractors. The Court reasoned that the United States was 
subjected to the same treatment in this regard as the State and 
its political subdivisions, and that this satisfied the 
constitutional requirement of equal treatment. 
It appears that Keweit and the United States also 
raised two Supremacy Clause issues. The first one is quite 
different from that raised in the present case. They argued 
that the sections of the Act providing for the licensing of 
public contractors interfered with the functions of the Federal 
government by giving the State a power of review over whether 
or not a contractor is eligible to do business with the United 
States. But they also argued, according to the Montana court, 
that "this Act violates the immunity of the federal government 
from taxation or the economic impact of taxation." The court 
rejected that claim, relying on the authority of James v~ Dravo 
construction · co~, 302 u.s. 134 (1937), for the proposition that 
a state may tax an independent contractor for the privilege of 
doing work within the state, even if that work is done under 
contract to the United States. App. to J.S., pp. 122-23. The 
court concluded that the gross receipts tax "was not aimed at 
nor does it impede the federal government in performing its 
functions. If there is any burden on the federal government, it 
is indirect and not substantial." 
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that a 
strong argument can be made for the position that the United 
States is precluded at this time from relitigating the 
constitutionality of the Act in federal court. In the 
following discussion, I assume that the United States is not 
barred, and consider the merits of its claim that the Act is 
unconstitutional. 
II. The -constitutionality of · the Act 
~ /L_S. L..-._/ 
~~4~ 
 
By a 2-to-1 vote, the three-judge district court held 
that the Act violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
r--' -
The DC based this holding on the conclusion that the Act 
discriminates against the United States in two ways. First, 
though contractors dealing with the State and the Federal 
Government are subject to the tax, and accordingly incorporate 
the amount of the tax into their bids, the State recoups the 
net tax paid as general revenue. Thus, the State pays an 
effective price lower than that paid by the Federal Government 
for the same work. This discrimination against the Federal 
Government in favor of the State the DC held to violate the 
Supremacy Clause. Second, the DC concluded that that Act 
discriminates against the Federal Government in favor of 
Private purchasers of construction services, because 
contractors working for the latter are exempted from the gross 
receipts tax. 
Because it held that the Act violates the Supremacy 
Clause, the DC declined to consider the additional argument 
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. For the same 
reason, it did not consider the related claim that the Equal 
Protection issue is foreclosed by the decision of the Montana 
Supreme Court in the Keweit cases. 
A. suoremacy ·clause ·rssue. 
The SG argues that the exemption of private 
contractors from the payment of the gross receipts tax is the 
crucial factor in rendering the tax unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause. His argument in this respect has two 
distinct themes. 
~
The first is that the tax puts contractors who deal 
with the Federal Government in a worse position tha 
contractors. This constitutes, according to the SG, 
"discrimination in favor of private parties at the expense of 
the United States and those with whom it deals." The SG 
contends that the Supremacy Clause requires that the tax be 
imposed "evenhandedly" on all contractors in the State. 
The SG's second theme rests on what he perceives to be -----------
the policy underlying the Supremacy Clause law on tax 
~ 
immunities of the Federal Government. The Federal Government 
and those with whom it deals can be protected from the abuse of 
oppressive taxation only if the taxes to which they are 
subjected are also imposed upon some additional group of 
persons and entities that will provide a political check on the 
rate of taxation. In the present case, the SG contends, there 
is no political check on the gross receipts tax. To the extent 
that public contractors dealing with the State charge the State 
a higher price because of higher gross receipts taxes, the 
State recovers the increment in receipt of the tax. Thus, it 
is a matter of indifference to the State and its contractors at 
what level the gross receipts tax is set. Private contractors 
and their customers are likewise indifferent to the level of 
the tax. The only real transfer of wealth under the gross 
receipts tax is from the Federal Government to the State. 
The SG acknowledges that one of the difficulties with 
his second argument is the finding of the DC that the 
subdivisions of the State are placed in precisely the same 
position as is the Federal Government. They do not recover any 
of the gross receipts tax paid by their contractors, so that 
the level of the gross receipts tax is of considerable concern 
to them. Presumably, it therefore becomes a concern to the 
taxpayers of those subdivisions, or at least of those 
subdivisions that do not receive contributions from the State 
in excess of any transfer to the State occurring through the 
operation of the gross receipts tax. The SG's treatment of 
this point begs the question entirely: 
"Once it is shown that the tax 
discriminates against the federal 
government by favoring similarly 
situated constituents within the state, 
the tax must fail: its 
constitutionality cannot be restored by 
'~L--.~ 
tvv~~~ 
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showing that the state also 
discriminates aqainst other 
governmental entities." 
The State, in contrast to the SG, addresses both of 
the aspects of "discrimination" found by the DC. With respect 
to the discrimination between the State and Federal Governments 
attributable to the receipt of the tax by the State but not the 
Federal Government, the State argues that the DC's decision has 
sweeping and untoward effects. Any tax levied by the State and 
paid both by persons doinq business with the State and by 
persons doing business with the Federal Government will have 
the effect that the DC found objectionable. Despite this 
effect, the State points out, this Court has approved such 
State taxes repeatedly. E~q~, James · v~ ·Dravo ·construction Co~, 
..._. . 
302 u.s. 134 (1937) (tax on gross receipts of construction 
contractors): Alabama v~ ·Kinq · &·Boozer, 314 u.s. 1 (1941) 
(sales tax): United States · v~ Boyd, 378 u.s. 39 (1964) (use tax 
on property owned by state or federal government but used by 
independent contractors). The State argues that the relevant 
test regarding discrimination between the State and the Federal 
Government is not whether the net economic effect of a state 
tax is the same for the State and the Federal Government -- it 
can never be the same -- but rather whether those dealing with 
the State government are treated in the same way as those 
dealing with the Federal Government. Phillips · chemical · co~ · v~ 
76 (1960). Here, as the State 
points out, all public contractors are subject to the same tax. 
It is this first aspect of the DC's holding --
discrimination in favor of the State based on receipt of the 
tax by the State -- that has so alarmed the numerous States 
that have filed briefs as amici · curiae. 
With respect to the exemption of private contractors 
from the gross receipts tax and the consequent exposure of the 
federal government to oppressive taxation, the State points out 
the exposure of political subdivisions and their taxpayers to 
the same treatment. Seep. 15 ~upra. The State also rejects 
as simplistic the SG's "two-pocket" conception of State taxing 
and expenditures. The State insists that its taxing and 
purchasing decisions are separated one from the other, so that 
it is misleading to imagine that it makes no difference to the 
State that a high gross receipts tax is reflected in the price 
it pays for the services of contractors. 
I think that the State is correct with regard to the 
discrimination that the DC perceived in the receipt of the tax 
by the State. All State taxes have the effect that the DC 
found objectionable, and it is at least clear that this Court 
since James v~ Dravo ·construction Co~, supra, has not 
invalidated State taxes just because the Federal Government may 
bear the ultimate burden of the tax. 
The effect of the exemption of orivate contractors on 
the constitutionality of the Act is a more difficult question, 
I 
perhaps best put into perspective by a brief historical note. 
For many years the Court read the decision in M'Culloch v~ 
~aryland to forbid state taxes on those with contractual 
relationships with the Federal Government if the effect of the 
tax was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal 
Government of performinq its functions. Beginning around 1937, 
however, with the decision in James v~ Dravo ·construction Co~, 
the Court moved away from this broad Suoremacy Clause immunity 
for the Federal Government and those dealing with it. There is 
much in the subsequent decisions that reflects the confusion 
and uncertainty of the Court in developing some new principle 
to delineate the authority of the States to lay taxes that 
affect the United States. The decision in United States v~ 
County of ·Fresno, 429 u.s. 452 (1977), appears to me to have 
been an attempt to synthesize and state with precision the new 
standard as it had been developed in the forty years since 
Jarnes · v~ · oravo · construction · co~ 
At issue in Fresno was the constitutionality of a 
California statute levying a tax on the possessory interest of 
individuals in improvements on tax-exempt land. Under this 
statute, the County of Fresno imposed a tax on the use by 
United States Forest Service employees of houses supplied to 
them by the United States. The Court began its consideration 
of the constitutionality of the statute by reviewing the 
Supremacy Clause basis for the Federal Government's immunity 
from State taxation, as set forth in M'Culloch v~ ·Maryland. 
In M'Culloch, the Court noted that the power to tax 
the national bank could be use to destroy the bank, effectively 
repealing the federal law creating the bank. Since the federal 
law is the "supreme law of the land," the Court reasoned, such 
a de facto repeal would be unconstitutional. The State 
suggested that even so, the tax that it had levied would not 
destroy the bank, but the Court rejected that suggestion. 
"If the State's poweer to tax the bank 
were recognized in principle, the Court 
doubted the ability of federal courts 
to review each exercise of such power 
to determine whether the tax would or 
would not destroy a federal function." 
Fresno, 429 u.s. at 458. The Court also rejected the argument 
that iust as the State will not abuse its power to tax its own 
citizens, it will not impose oppressive taxes on a federal 
function. 
"A State's constituents can be relied 
on to vote out of office any 
legislature that imposes an abusively 
high tax on them. They cannot be 
relied upon to be similarly motivated 
when the tax is instead solely on a 
federal function." 
Id., at 458-59. Because the Court thought this distinction 
between the political checks on the two types of taxes so 
significant, it limited its holding by stating that it did not 
extend to a tax "imposed on the interest which the citizens of 
Maryland may hold in this institution [the bank], in common 
with other property of the same description throughout the 
State." 4 Wheat., at 436. 
The Court in Fresno noted that M'Culloch has been and continues 
to be understood to preclude State taxes levied directly on the 
Federal Government, or with a legal incidence on the Federal 
Government. But it also noted that "decisions of this Court 
since M'Culloch have been less uniform on the question whether 
taxes, the economic but not the leqal incidence of which falls 
in part or in full on the Federal Government, are invalid." 
After reviewing the decisions since James · v~ Dravo Construction 
Co~, the Court formulated the following rule. 
"The rule to be derived from the 
Court's more recent decisions, then, is 
that the economic burden on a federal 
function of a state tax imposed on 
those who deal with the Federal 
Government does not render the tax 
unconstitutional so long as the tax is 
imposed equally on the other similarly 
situated constituents of the State. 
This rule returns to the original 
intent of M'Culloch · v~ Maryland. The 
political checK*against a5use of the 
taxing power found lacking in 
M'Culloch, where the tax was imposed 
solely on the Bank of the United 
States, is present where the State 
imposes a nondiscriminatory tax only on 
its constituents or their artificially 
owned entities:11 ••.• 
-rr-:--.Atax-on-tFie1ncome of federal 
employees, or a tax on the possessory 
interest of federal employees in 
Government houses, if imposed only on 
them, could be escalated by a State so 
as to destroy the federal function 
performed by them either by making the 
Federal Government unable to hire 
anyone or by causing the Federal 
Government to pay prohibitively hiqht 
salaries. This danger would never 
arise, however, if the tax is also 
imposed on the income and property 
interests of all other residents and 
voters of the State." 
Fresno, 429 u.s., at 462-63. 
The Court applied its analysis to the California tax 
by first concluding that the legal incidence of the tax was not 
on the Federal Government or its property. The only remaining 
question then was whether the tax was discriminatory with 
respect to the federal function, that is, whether its incidence 
was so limited as to destroy the political checking function 
first noticed in M'Culloch. The Court concluded that the tax 
was not discriminatory because it was equivalent to the 
property tax imposed on owners of non-exempt property and 
passed on to them by their lessees. "Consequently, the 
appellants who rent from the Forest Service are no worse off 
under California tax laws than those who work for private 
employers and rent houses in the private sector." Id. at 465. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a similar 
analysis of the economic incidence of a tax on the use of tax-
exempt property owned by the United States in United States v. 
City of ·netroit, 355 u.s. 466 (1958). 
Defining the "discrimination" proscribed by the 
Supremacy Clause in terms of the political check on oprressive 
taxation by a State seems sensible to me. It establishes a 
rather generous constitutional limitation on State taxation 
affecting the Federal Government, and one that does not depend 
on a weighing by the Court in each case of whether the tax in 
question is so high that it actually burdens the functions of 
the Federal Government. At the same time, it is a limitation 
that should prevent State tax burdens so heavy as to impair the 
operation of federal law, and that, in the most general terms, 
is the purpose of the Supremacy Clause. Within the limitation 
so established, it continues to be open to Congress to further 
immunize the Federal Government and those dealing with it from 
State taxation. City · of · oetroit · v~ Murray · corp~, 355 u.s. 489, 
495 (1958). 
I also think that the Court misapplied its standard of 
discrimination in the Fresno case. Instead of sticking with 
the idea of "discrimination" defined in terms of the political 
check on oppressive taxation, the Court slipped over into a 
kind of equal protection analysis of discriminatory effect. It 
established that all persons who rented homes in California 
were subiect (directly or indirectly) to roughly the same tax 
burden. That was probably true. But the fact that those who 
rent from the federal government and those who rent from 
private landlords end up with (roughly) the same rent bill 
because of two ·different · taxes does not show that there is any 
effective political check on the tax levied on those renting 
from the federal government. Presumably, the private renters 
would prefer to see that tax raised, while their own (indirect) 
tax remained the same or was lowered, so long as the overall 
revenue needs of the county were satisfied. 
What the Court should have examined in Fresno was the 
incidence of the use tax that the federal employees paid. In 
fact, the California statute authorized the imposition of the 
use tax on all possessory interests in improvements on tax-
exempt land; accordingly, all persons with such interests, and 
not just those with such interests related to Federal land, 
were subject to the tax. If this larger group proved large 
enough to provide a significant check on oppressive imposition 
of the use tax on federal employees, then the discrimination 
test of the Supremacy Clause should have been held to be 
satisfied. Thus, in United States · v~ City of Detroit, supra, 
the Court noted not only the equivalent economic burden on 
owners of private property and users of federally owned 
property. It also noted that "the [use] tax applies to every 
private party who uses exempt property in Michigan in 
connection with a business conducted for private gain. Under 
Michigan law this means persons who use property owned by the 
Federal Government, the State, its political subdivisions, 
churches, charitable organizations, and a great host of other 
entities." Id;, 355 u.s. at 473. 
In the present case the political subdivisions of the 
State, and their taxpayer-voters, would seem to me to provide a 
strong and effective check on oppressive use of the gross 
receipts tax against the Federal Government and those 
contractors who do business with it. But there is no doubt 
that if gross receipts from private contracts were also subject 
to the tax, another group of taxpayer-voters, private 
purchasers of contractors' services, would also be concerned 
with the rate at which the gross receipts tax is levied. As I 
see it, the only question is whether the Act is 
unconstitutional because it fails to include as strong a 
political check on abusive taxation as it might have done. The 
Court was willing to say in Fr~sno that a group of taxpayers 
subject (indirectly) to a different tax (private tenants 
subject to (passed on) property taxes on their landlords) would 
guard adequately against abuse of the use tax imposed on 
renters of federally owned homes. I think that the interests 
of the State's subdivisions and their taxpayer-voters in this 
case will provide at least as strong a check on the use of the 
gross receipts tax. 
B. Th~ · Equal · prot~ction · Issu~ 
The DC did not consider the Equal Protection claim, as 
noted above. In his Brief, the SG concentrates his attention 
on the decisions of this Court dealing with the Supremacy 
Clause immunity of the Federal Government. Since the issue was 
not considered below, and is not pressed in this Court, I see 
no need for the Court to consider it now. 
It is difficult even to find a clear formulation of 
• 
the equal protection claim. The appellant treats the issue in 
its Brief, pp. 18-22, and formulates the question as the 
acceptability of the distinction drawn between public 
contractors and private contractors, as if all contractors were 
permanently classified as one or the other. But as I have 
noted at the head of this memorandum, the tax is levied on the 
receipts from public contracts. Contractors are free to engage 
in both public and private contracts, or to engage in only 
private contracts if they wish not to pay the tax. Further, 
the tax is a potential cost for every bidder on any public 
contract, so all potential public contractors are subject to 
the same tax cost. In addition, since the SG's Supremacy 
Clause argument rests on the assumption that the tax is shifted 
from the contractor to the purchaser, I do not see how he could 
argue that contractors who pay the gross receipts tax are 
disadvantaged. 
The only perceptible differential impact of the tax is 
between public and private purchasers of contractors' services. 
Any conclusion that there is a significant difference in this 
regard would have to rest on the assumption that the gross 
receipts tax is shifted from the contractor to the purchaser of 
his services. There is no support in the record for such an 
assumption. Further, I think it would be a bad idea to 
entertain equal protection claims based on the actual rather 
than legal incidence of a tax. Finally, I think that even if 
the actual incidence of the tax is on the public bodies paying 
for the construction, and even if equal protection claims can 
be based on actual economic incidence rather than legal 
incidence, the discrimination can be justified in this case. 
The gross receipts tax is levied as part of a general statutory 
plan for the licensing and regulation of contractors performing 
public contracts. This system is maintained for the benefit of 
all public bodies making use of construction contracting 
services within the State. It seems reasonable to me to impose 
a tax that is paid (indirectly) by those benefitting from the 
maintenance of this licensing and regulatory system. 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.juvrtm.t Q}llllrlttf tlrt ~b. ~mttg 
JfuJrittgLm. ~. ~ 2ll&f'! ~ 
January 17, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1134, Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood, 
My only problem with this opinion is the long para-
graph beginning on page 21 discussing other "recognized excep-
tions to collateral estoppel." First, it strikes me that this 
paragraph is _g..r. at~s. More importantly, there is substan-
tial doubt whether situations discussed are really 
"recognized exceptions." For example, the first situation--
when a defendant is forced to litigate an issue of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction in state court -- is not a recognized 
exception as far as I am aware. At best, it is an open 
question. The only citation in support is a student Note in 
the Harv. L. Rev. arguing for a change in current doctrine. 
Other commentators have argued to the contrary. ~ Currie, 
Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 
(1978). 
Similarly, the second situation discussed -- a statu-
tory right that presupposes determination of factual questions 
in a federal forum -- is also unsettled. The authority cited 
in footnote 11, the Gardner-Denver case, deals only with 
arbitral awards which pose a far different question. Also 
cited is another student piece in the Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
Finally, the footnote states that this Court has left open the 
question of "the scope of preclusion with respect to § 1983 
claims that could have been asserted in prior state court 
proceedings : " Two dissenting opinions are cited. In Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 497, however, the Court stated that 
"[R]es judicata has been held to be fully applicable to a civil 
rights action brought under § 1983." While this statement is 
not a holding, the question might not really be so open, and at 
the very least, this discussion should not be in a paragraph 
labeled "recognized exceptions" to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. 
- 2 -
The rest of the paragraph deals with England. In the 
briefs, Montana argued that the government was barred from 
relitigating by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and England 
abstention. By deciding to preclude relitigation of the 
dispute because of collateral estoppel, there is no need to 
reach the England question. Placing the discussion of England 
under "recognized exceptions" to collateral estoppel seems to 
me to confuse two distinct issues. England simply does not in-
volve collateral estoppel. 
In short, I would hope that you might give favorable 
consideration to the possibility of deleting this entire para-
graph and its accompanying footnotes. If the paragraph is de-
leted, I shall gladly join the opinion. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-1134, Montana · v; ·united ·states 
Justice Marshall's opinion contains a thorough 
discussion of this case and the issues presented. My only 
reservations concern Part III.C, beqinning at p. 20. 
The discussion of Moser at pp. 20-21 sets forth the 
principle that in "successive actions involving unrelated 
subject matter," decisions of law in earlier cases may not be 
preclusive on a party to the earlier action. By stressing the 
distinction between related and unrelated demands in the 
successive actions, the opinion appears to be concerned with 
situations in which a broad holdinq on some question of law in 
one action might be urged as precluding the losing party from 
securinq reexamination of that holding in a subsequent action 
involving different facts. Such preclusion might be 
unwarranted, the opinion seems to imply, if the new factual 
situation raises considerations that could not have been 
forseen at the time of the first action. 
This part of the opinion is oblique, at best. But the 
result it arques for is familiar -- limitinq previous rulinqs 
------~-------~------------------------
of law narrowly to the facts of the prior case, even though in 
~ ~------------------------the prio 
terms. 
inion those rules may have been announced in broad 
This "overrulinq without overrulinq" is an accepted ______..., 
feature of constitutional adjudication. I am not sure that it 
makes much sense to discuss it in terms of the Moser case, 
which did not involve constitutional litiqation, but I think 
the underlyinq principle and practice are clear enouqh to 
survive this bit of confusion. 
Justice Stewart's letter of January 17, 1979, to --------"'-
Justice Marshall raises several qood points. The first and 
-------~~------------second sentences of the paraqraph beqinninq on p. 21 of the 
opinion, and the footnotes to those sentences, are 
overstatements of the law of collateral estoppel on the points / 
mentioned. I think it would be well to wait and see how I 
Justice Marshall responds to Justice Stewart's suqqestions. 
I disagree with Justice Stewart about the Enqland 
case. The doctrine of that case is simply an application of 
the general doctrine of preclusion irl the context of federal 
court abstention. A party should not be precluded by a state 
court judgment unless he has submitted freely to the state ~ .... ~ _..._ __________ _ 
court the issue determined by it. This rule of Enqlanrl should 
2. 
apply equally whether the preclusion suggested is res · jn,dicatd. 
(same parties) or collateral estoppel (as in this case, a party 
in federal court that controlled one side of the litigation in 
the state court). Since the parties arqued extensively about 
the effect of England in this case, I think Justice Marshall 
properly refers to the case in his opinion. 
3. 
~ltprtnu (!fourt of tqt ~nittb .;§tatts 
'Dasltittgton, ~. "f. 2ll~J~~ 
CHAMI!IERS OF' 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 18, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1134 - Montana v. United States 
Dear Potter: 
I am willing to delete the first two sentences and 
accompanying footnotes of the first full paragraph on 
p. 21 of United States v. Montana, beginning "We note 
also .••. " Although as a review of the law journal 
articles cited in fns. 10 and 11 will reflect, there is 
certainly case law authority for the propositions 
advanced in text, I agree that it is unnecessary to 
address the points in this opinion. 
I am, however, reluctant to dispense with a 
discussion of England v. Medical Examiners. Since both 
the state and Government strenuously argued England, and 
the dissent below partially relied on it, our reference 
is scarcely gratuitous. And while it is true that 
England involved res judicata, I see nothing in . the 
reasoning of the opinion to suggest that a different 
result would obtain where collateral estoppel was 
applicable. If a party forced into state court could not 
be precluded under res judicata from litigating the federal 
claims that he reserved, a fortiori, a controlling non-
party could not be foreclosed under the same circumstances. 
At the very least, we should be careful to dispel any 
inference to the contrary, which is how fn. 12 is presently 
phrased. 
As to the discussion on the top of p. 23, I think it 
beyond argument that unfairness or inadequacy of prior 
procedures constitutes a recognized exception to collateral 





justified on the theory that a party has had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate his claims in a prior 
proceeding, and I think its important to note in text 
that the Government does not dispute the fairness of 
its previous opportunity in this case. 
Accordingly, I will rewrite the first full paragraph 
beginning on p. 21 to read: 
"Nor does this case implicate the right 
of a litigant who has 'properly invoked the 
jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to 
consider federal constitutional claims,' and 
who is then 'compelled, without his consent .. 
• , to accept a state court's determination of 
those claims.' England v. Medical Examiners, 
375 u.s. 411, 415 (.1964) (footnote omitted)." 
The text of the remainder of pages 22-23 will follow. 
Footnotes 10 and 11 of the first draft will be deleted, 




Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
.inpumt Qf.tntrl of tlft 'J!hrittb ,j~s 
';Was!p:ngton. ~. (!f. 2.(J~Jl·2 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART January 18, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1134 - Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood : 
Thanks for your letter of today, and for your will-
ingness to accommodate my views. The chanvgopose 
are entirely satisfactory, and I am glad t join yo r 
opinion for the Court as so modified. 
Sincerely yours, 
/ 
Mr. Justice Marshal l 
Copies to the Conference 
·. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§ltprtutt <!f01trl o-f t4t ~ltili~ ~taf.tg 
'J.t IUJ ~tltg:fO'lt, ~. <!f. 2LJ§J!-~ 
January 18, 1979 
. \ 
Re: No. 77-1134 - Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your circulation of January 17 as 
modified by your letter of today to Potter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Mar shall 
cc: The Conference 
. 
• 
~uprmtt <!Jll'Url .of tJrt ~ .i)bdtg 
JragJritt.gfutt. !B. <If. 2.(]'~)!, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 18, 1979 
Re: 77-1134 - Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~0. 77-1134 
State of Montana et a!.. 
Appellants, On Appeal from the United States 
District Court for the District of v. 
United States. 
Montana. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.~~ 
The State of Montana imposes a one percent gross receipts 
tax upon contractors of public. but not private. construction 
11 
-~ _ _ _ I 
projec . Montana Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-3505 (Supp. 1975).~
1 1 '4-~{505 (5), :\fontalla Hev. Code~ Ann. (Supp. 197i) proYide,c /A...A-
"eac~r~ublic contractor ~ hall pay to the state an additional licrn:-;e fee i~~ 
a sum equal to one prr crnt (1 % ) of the gro~:; receiptti from public~ 
contracts during thr incomr ~·ra r for which the licen~e i~ issurd ... . " ~ f 
The Act defines public ron tractors to includr: 
m thr fcrm of 
·. 
77-1134-0PINION 
2 MONTANA v. U~ITED STATES 
A public contractor may credit against the gross receipts tax 
its paymeuts of personal property. corporate income, and 
individual income taxes.~ Any remaining gross receipts lia-
bility is customarily passed on in the form of incrPased 
construction costs to the governmental unit financing the 
project.a At issue in this appeal is whether a prior judgment 
by the Montana Supreme Court upholding the tax precludes 
the United fltates from contesting its constitutionality and if 
not, whether the tax -discriminates against the Federal Gov-
ernment in violation of the l::iupremacy Clause. 
I 
In 1971, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., the contractor on a federal 
dam project in Montana: brought suit in state court contend..: 
ing that the Montana gross receipts tax unconstitutionally 
discriminated against the Pnited States and the companies 
with which it dealt. The litigation waE directed and financed 
by the United States. Less than a month after the state suit 
was filed, the Government initiated this challenge to the 
constitutionality of the tax in the trnited States District 
Court for the District of Montana. On stipulation by the 
parties, the instaut case was continued pending resolution of 
the state-court litigation. · 
That litigation concluded in a unanimous decision by the 
Montana Supreme Court sustaining the tax. Peter Kiewit 
Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 
P. 2d 102 (1973) (Kiewit !). · The court found the distinc~ 1 
tion between public and private contractors consistent with 
the mandates of the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses. 
recript:;' shall not inrlude ra~h di.:<rounts allowrd and takPn on :sale::: and 
:sales refund~:< , eitht>r in ca,;h or h~· crt>dit, uncol!ertihlt> aecount;,; writtt>n utf 
from time to timt>, or paymPnt::: rt>criv!'d in final liquidation of a<"count:; 
includC'd in the gro~~ rrrcipt.• of nny pn'viou:< return made by tlw p!'rson." 
1 rl., § 84-:~50 1 (3) . 
2 Set• :\lantana Rev. Codt>~ Ann.,§§ 84-351:) and 8-t-:).')l·t (Supp. 1977), 
SSetl App. 98-10~ ; 112-111,16-1. 
" I 
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ld., at 149-154, 505 P. 2u. at 108-110. The contractor subse-
quently filed a ~otice of Appeal to this Court. but abandoned 
its request for rf'viE:'w at the direction of the Solicitor General. 
App. to Juris. Statement 86-87. It then instituted a second 
action in stat£> court serking a refund for certain tax payments 
different from those involvE:'d in Kiewit I. On dE:'termining 
that the contractor's second legal claim was. in all material 
respects, identicaJ to its first. the Montana ~upreme C'ourt 
invokt:-d the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata 
to affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Peter Kiewit So'lls' 
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 166 Mont. 260, 531 P. 2d 1327 
( 1975) (Kiewit II ). 
After the decision in Kiewit II, a three-judge District Court 
heard the instant case on the merits. In a divided opinion , 
the court concluded that the United States was not boum.l by 
the Kiewit I decision. and struck dowu the tax as violative of 
the Supremacy Clause. 437 F. Supp. 354 (Mont. 1977). 
The majority began with the premise that the Supremacy 
Clause immunizes the Federal Govemment Hot oHly from 
direct taxation by the States, but also from indirect taxation 
that operates to discriminate against the Government or those 
with whom it transacts business. ld., at 359. See United 
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466. 473 (1958); Phillips 
Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 F S. 
376, 387 (1960). Because no private contractors were subject 
to the Montana gross receipts tax. the court reasoned that 
the statute impermissibly singled out the Federal Govern-
ment and those with whom it dealt for disparate treatment. 
That the tax applied to state and municipal as well as 
federal contractors rlid not, in the majority's view. negate 
the statute's discriminatory character. For although con-
tractors on state projects might pass on the amount of 
their tax liability to the ~tate in the form of higher construc-
tion costs. Montana would n•coup its additional expenditure 
through the revenue that the tax generated. By contrast, 
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wh<'n f0deral contractors shifted the burden of their increased 
costs to the Fnited States. it would receive no such offsetting 
revenues. Accordingly. the court concluded that the statut(l 
encroached upon tlw immunity from discriminatory taxation 
enjoyed by the Federal Government under the Supremacy 
Clause. 437 F . Supp .. at 3;")8-350. OnP judge argued in 
dissent both that the rnited States was estopped from chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the tax and that the statutory 
schem<>. b<:'cause it Pncompassed receipts of municipal and 
state as well as federal contractors. was not discriminatory 
within the meauing of Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas In~ 
dependent School Dist., supra. 437 F. Supp., at 365- 366 
(Kilkenny, J .. dissenting). 8 
'\Ve noted probable jurisdiction. 436 U. S. 91G (19i)), 
Because we find that the constitutional question presented by 
this appeal was determined adversely to the rnited States 
in a prior state proceeding. we reverse on grounds of collateral 
estoppel without reaching the merits. 
II 
A fundamental precPpt of common-law adjudication. em-
bodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata, is that a "right. question or fact distinctly put in 
issue and directly determined by a court of competent juris-
diction ... cannot be disputed iu a subsequent suit between 
the same parties or their privies .... '' Southern Pacific R. 
Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1. 48-49 (1897). Fnder res 
judicata, a final .i udgment on the merits bars further claims 
by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. 
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351. 352 (1877); Lawlor 
v . .Yational Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 32:2. 3:26 ( 1955); 
1B J. Moore. Federal Practice 1f 0.405 [ 1 J. at 621-6:24 (2d eel. 
H.l74); Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 47 (Tent. Draft 
No.1. March 28. Hl73) (merger); id., ~48 (bar). Under 
collateral estoppel. once an issue is actually and necessarily 
'determined by a court of competent jurisdiction , that dctc•r-
-
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mination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different 
cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. 
Parkkme Hosiery v. Shore, - U. S. -, - n. 5; Scott. 
Collaterai Estoppel by Judgment. 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1. 2-3 
(1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 68 (Tent. 
Draft No. 4. Apr. 15. H)77) (issue preclusion). Application 
of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil 
courts havf been established. the conclusive resolution of 
disputes \Vithin tl-lrir jurisdictions. Southern Pacific Railroad, 
supra, at 49; Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 r. S. 
294. 299 (1917) . To preclude parties from contesting matters 
that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation 
attending multiple lawsuits. conserves judicial resources. anti 
fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possi-
bility of inconsistent decisions.' 
These interests are similarly implicated when nonparties 
assume control over litigation in which they have a direct 
financial or proprietary interest and then seek to redetermine 
issues previously resolved." As this Court observed in Soul-
front v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 F R. 475. 486--487 
(1910) , the persons for whose benefit and at whose direction 
a cause of action is litigated cannot be said to be "strangers 
to the cause. . . . [O]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in 
4 SE-e Hazard, He;: X ova in Res Judicata, 44 ~ . Calif. L. Hrv. 1036, 
1042-104;3 (1971) ; Vr~tal, Pn•clusion/He~ .Tudicat;t \'ariahlr:; : Adjudi-
cating Bodieo, 54 Georgt-town L. .1. 857, 1-158 {19u6); DrvPlotJmPnt::; in the 
Law-He" Judicata, ti5 Harv. L. HeY . S18, ~::!0 (Hl.52) . 
~Although thl, trrm .. privi r~" ha~ brcn u~ed ou ol'ca ~iou to deuominatP 
nonparties who control litigation, ~PP, e. g .. Merriam v. ::iaaljil'ld. 241 U. S. 
22, 2i (1916); l{p:;tatl'tnl'llt of .lud~me nt,.: §I':~ . (·ouuurnt a (1\.!~2). thi,; 
usage hns bt:'Pn crit icizrd a,; conclu~ory and anal~·ticall~· llll l:'OIIud . 1 H 
1\Joort:', Fedrral Pr:u:ttr<' ~j OAll , pp . 155:3 (~d l'd . HJ74): d . DPvPlop-
mPnts, supra. fi5 Harv. L. Ht-v ., at. ~5u . Thl' IIOII1PIH:latur<> has bf'l:'n 
ahaudonl'd in tlw :tppi!rahl(• "l'rtioll of thr Srt'ond Edition of thr nr:;tatf'-
'mPnt. Sr<·, HP~tateml'nt (~t><"ond) of .Judgment,.: § l'>:i (T<•nt . Draft Xo. '!, 
Apr. 1~, 19(.)), 
~ ,, 
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the name of another to establish and protect his own right. or 
who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid 
of some interest of his ow11 ... is as much bound ... as he 
would be if he had beeu a party to the record." See Schnell 
v. Peter Eckrich & Sons , Inc. , 365 l'" . . S. 260, 262 n. 4 ( Hl61); 
cf. Zenith Radio Corp. V. Hazelti11e Research, Inc. , 39:5 e. S. 
100, 111 (Hl69). Preclusion of such nonparties falls under ~ 
the rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res· judicata 
because the latter doctrine presupposes identity between causes 
of action. And the cause of action which a nonparty has 
vicariously asserted differs by definition from that which he 
subsf'quently seeks to litigate in his own right. See Merriam 
v. Saalfi.eld, 241 C'. 8. 22. 29 (1916); Restatement (Second)-
of Judgments, ~ 83, Comment b, p. 51 (Tent. Draft Xo. 2. 
Apr. 15. 1975); lB Moore. supra, ~ 0.411 [6]. at 1553- 1554; 
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 
818. 862 (1952). 
That the United States exercised control over the Kiewit I 
litigation is not in dispute. 'The Government has stipulated 
that it: 
"(1) required the Kieurit /la·wsuit to be filed; 
"(2) reviewed and approved the complaint; 
"(3) pa.id the attomeys' fees and costs; 
"( 4) directed the appeal from state district court to 
the Montana Supreme Court; 
"(5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus in the 
Montana Supreme Court; 
" ( 6) directed the filing of a ~ otice of Appeal to this 
Court; and 
"(7) effectuated Kiewit's abandonme11t of that appeal 
on advice of the Solicitor General." App. to Juris. State--
ment, 86- 87. 
Thus, although not a party, the United States plainly had a 
sufficient "laboring oar'' in the conduct of the state-court 
litigation to actuate principles of estoppel. Drummond v. 
-
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United States, 324 lT. S. 316, 318 ( Hl45). See Schn'3ll v. 
Peter Eckrich & Sons, supra, at 262 n. 4; Souffront v. Com-
pagnie des Suceries, supra, at 486-487; Watts v. Swiss Bank 
Corp., 27 X. Y. 2d 270, 277-278, 265 N. E. 2d 739, 743-744 
(1970). 
III 
To determine the appropriate application of collateral es-
toppel in the instant case necessitates three further inquiries: 
first, whether the issues presented by this litigation are iu 
substance the same as those resolved against the United 
States in Kiewit I; second. whether controlling facts or legal 
principles have changed significantly since the state-court 
judgment; and finally. whether other special circumstances 
warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion. 
A 
A review of the record in Kiewit I dispels auy doubt that 
the plaiutiff there raised and the Montana Supreme Court 
there decided the precise constitutional claim that the "United 
States advances here. In its complaint in Kiewit I, the con-
tractor allf)ged that the gross receipts tax and regulations 
promulgated thereumler were unconstitutional because they. 
inter alia: 
"(a) illegally discriminate against the Plaintiff. the 
United States. and its agencies and instrumentalities, and 
those with whom the United States does business. and 
deny them due process of law and the equal protection of 
the laws; 
"(b) illegally impose a tax 011 Plaintiff which is not 
uniform upon the same class of subjects; 
"(c) illegally and improperly interfere with the Federal 
Govemment's power to select contractors and schedule 
construction and ... conflict vvith Federal law and policy 
regulating Federal procurement; 
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ernment and its instruments (including Plaintiff) from 
state control in the performance of their functions; [and} 
"(f) illf'gally frustrat<' the Federal poliey of selecting tlw 
lowest possible bidtkr . . . . " App. 37. 
The Montana Court rejected those contentions on thf' t1H•ory 
that: 
"The federal gpvemmen t is being treated in the same-
manner as the state of Montana treats itself and its sub-
divisions or municipalities. The only discrimination the 
federal government can claim is that private contractors 
are not paying the same tax as public contractors. How-
ever, according to [Phillips Chemical Co. v. DuntM 
School Dist., 361 F S. 376 (l!:l60) and Alvses Lake 
Homes v. Grant County, 365 F. S. 744 (19tH) l ... all 
[that is] requin•d is that the state does not give itself 
special treatment ovE'r that received by the federal gov-
ernment. The Act involved here treats the fedE'ral gov-
ernment in the same manner as it treats those who deal 
with any part of the state government.' ' Kiew·it I , 161 
Mont.. at 152. 505 P. 2cl. at 109. 
No different constitutional challenge · is at issue in this 
litigation. Indeed. the l:'nited States' amended complaint 
tracks almost verbatim the language of the plaintiff's in 
Kiewit I in alleging that the Montana tax provisions: 
"(1) illegally discriminate against the plaintiff. United 
States. and its agencies and instrumentalities. and those 
with \Vhom the rnited States does business in violation 
of the Supremacy Clause. Article VI. Clause 2. and the 
Fourteenth Amendment; 
"{2) illegally impose a tax on plaintiff's contractors and 
subcontractors which is not uniform upon the same class 
of subjects in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
·"{3) illegally fore<' the L"nited States of America to pay· 
•. 
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more for its construction than does a private party or 
corporation in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Art. 
VI, Cl. 2; [and] 
"(5) ... illegally interferes with the Federal Govern-
ment's free choice to choose its contractors and fruEtrates 
the policy of choosing the lowest bidder in violation of 
federal procurement law and the tiupremacy Clause. Art. 
IV, Cl. 2." App. 67. 
Thus. the "question expressly and definitely presented in 
this suit is the same as that definitely and actually litigated 
and adjudged ' ' adversely to the Government in state court. 
United States v. iVI oser, 266 r. S. 236. 242 ( 1924). Absent 
significant changes in controlling facts or legal principles 
since Kiewit I, or other special circumstances. the Montana 
Supreme Court's resolution of these issues is concluEive here. 
B 
Relying on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 F S. 591 ( 1948). 
the United States argueE that collateral eEtoppel extends only 
to contexts in which "the controlling facts and applicable 
legal ruleEJ remain unchanged." I d., at 600. In the Govern-
ment's view, factual stasis is missing here because the con-
tract at issue in Kiewit I contained a critical provision which 
the contracts involved in the imtant litigation do not. 
Under its contract with the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Kiewit was unable to take advantage of the credit provisions 
of the gross receipts tax. 11 In 1971. however. the 'C'nited 
6 Clau::e 58 of the contract enumerated the credit provision:-: of the 
:\Iontan<~ ::;tatute and provided that: " [t]he Contractor. and, in inrn, tlw 
subcentractors will not take advantage of the::;£' credits." Peter Kieu·it 
and Sons' Co. v. State Board of Equalization (Kiewit I), ltil :\font. HO, 
145-146, sos P. 2d 102. 10u (197:n . 
The record doPS uot rdlf'rt the reason for th£' Governm:-nt's policy. 
See Tr. of Oral Arg. :{5 . 
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StatPs altPrccl its policy and has since required Montana 
contractors to seek all available refunds ami credits. See 
United States v. 1\tf ontana, 437 F. Supp .. at 3.54; App. 91. As 
the Govemment reads the Kiewit I decision. the Montaua 
Supr('me Court proceeded on th~ assumption that if Kiewit 
had beeu able to avail itself of the offsetting income and 
property tax credits. there might have been a "total washout" 
of its gross receipts tax liability. 161 Mont .. at 145. 505 P. 
2d. at 106. Thus. according to the Govemnwnt. the holding 
of KieH•it I \Vas that the Montaua statute did not discriminate 
against the United States under circumstancC's where. but for 
the Federal Government's own contractual arrangement. the 
tax might have had no financial impact. Brief of the Fnited 
States. 35-36. Because the uncontroverted evidence in this 
case establish('s that aftrr taking all credits available. federal 
contractors are still subject to a gross revenue tax of one-half 
of one percent. App. to .Juris. ~tatement 90. the Government. 
submits that the factual premise of the K ieurit I holding is 
absent here. 
We disagree.7 It is. of course. true that changes ill facts 
essential to a judgment will render collateral estoppel inap-
plicable in a subsequent actiou raising the same issues. ~ee. 
e. g., United States v. Certain Land at lrvi'II(J Place & 16th 
Street, 415 F. 2d 265, 269 (CA2 1969); Metcalf v. Cornmis-
7 A threshold difficulty with the Government':; argument is that the 
record doe,: not support its assertion that. contr11ctual provision:: barring· 
contrnctors from taking credits are "no longer applicable in the contracts 
involved in this litigation." Brirf for Unitetl States 16. SeP also Tr. of 
Oral Arg. :n. Thr \fontana gross receipts statute wa~ enacted in 1967, 
and t.he Government ha,: not limited itt:: rP4uest for rrlirf to gross receipt~ 
taxet:' paid aftrr 1971 wlwn the contractual provisions involvt•d in Kieu:it I 
wrrp discontinuf:'d. Set• pp. ~. supra. To thP contrary, thf:' Govern-
ment's amendpd complnint in the instant ca,.:e seeks a refund of all tax 
payrnrnts, le~s credit::;, made undl'r the ;\.fontana. statute. App. til\-6!:l. 
Thus, thf:'. Goverum!'nt ·~ coutrntion concerning factual changp:; dors not 
justify the District Court's rPfu:;al to invoke •rstopr~el with rr.spf'rt to the_· 
rre-19i.') eJaitn::< •. 
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siouer, 343 F . 2d 66, 67-68 (CAl 1965); Alexander v. Com-
missioner, 224 F. 2d 788. 792-793 (CAS )/f5'5J; lB Moore, 9 
supra, ~ 0.448. at 4232-4233. ~ 0.422 [ 4J. at 3412-3413. But 
we do not cvnstrue the opinion in Kiewit I as predicated on 
the factual assumption that the gross receipts tax would 
cancel out if public contractors took all available refunds and 
credits. 
The Montana Supreme Court adverted to the washout 
possibility when discussing the origin of the gross receipts tax 
as a revenue-enforcing rather than revenue-generating meas-
ure. Prior to the E-nactment of the statute. certain public 
contractors had evaded assessment of local property taxes by 
shifting equipment from one construction site to another. and 
by filing corporate or personal income tax retums that did not · 
fairly reflect the amount of profit attributable to construction 
projects within the State. 161 Mont.. at 143-145. 505 P. 2d. 
at 104-105.8 In establishing a flat percentage tax 011 gross 
receipts. with credits available for income and property tax 
payments. the Montana Legislature sought to remove any 
incentive for contractors to dissemble about the location of 
taxable equipment and the source of taxable reveuues. Under 
the statutory scheme. a coutractor who .paid a substantial 
amount of property or income taxes might. by claiming those 
payments as credits. effectively cancel out his gross receipts 
tax liability. !d., at 145 .. j05 P. 2d. at 105. Iu practice, the 
court noted in Kiewit/, the statute hac! not resulted in a total 
offset of the 1 ~ gross receipts payments in part because of 
provisions such as those in federal contracts. Ibid. , 505 P. 
2d, at 106. Significantly. however. the court did not rely on 
the potential absence of tax liability in its analysis of Kiewit's 
constitutional challenge. Indeed, it did not even allude tu 
the washout potential in the course of that discussion. !d., 
at 147- 154, 505 P. 2d. at 100-110. It focused rather on the 
8 Appan•tnl.'· th1• prob~em haJ not ari"l'll to anr apprrl'i11hlt> f'xtrnt witlr. 
l_lrivatt• contractor>'. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-(i... 
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rationality of the classification between public and private 
contractors. and 011 the parity of treatment betweeu the 
United States and other public contractors. Ibid. 
Our conclusion that tlw washout potential of the tax was 
not of controlling significance in K ieurit I is further reinforced 
by the Montana Supreme Court's holding in Kiewit II. 
There, the contractor alleged that its gross receipts tax lia-
bility had exceeded its property and income tax credits. and 
argued that "the -ouly basis" for the decision iu Kiewit I was 
that "if the Act were properly enforced it would result in a 
'washout.' '' Kiewit II, 166 Mont .. at 262. 531 P. 2d. at 1328. 
The Montana Supreme Court rejected that reading of Kie·urit 
I ar. "much too narro[w]. '' /d., at 263. 531 P. 2d. at 1329. 
That the offset possibility had not materialized for Kiewit 
was. in the court's view, a fact too "inconsequeutial" to 
warrant relitigation of the statute 's constitutionality. !d. , 
at 264, 531 P. 2d. at 132H. So too here. we cannot view the 
absence of a total washout as altering facts essential to the 
judgment in Ki3wit I. 
Thus. unless there have been major changes in the law 
governing intergovernmeutal tax immunity since Kiewit I , 
the Government's reliance on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 
U. S. 591. is misplaced. Sunnen involved the tax status of 
certain income generated by a license agreemeut during a 
particular tax period. Although previous litigatiou had set-
tled the status of income from the same agreement during 
earlier tax years. the Court declined to give collateral estoppel 
effect to the prior judgment because there had been a signifi-
cant "chauge in the legal climate." I d. , at 606. Fnderlying 
the Sunnen decision was a concem that modifications in 
"controlling legal principles." id., at 59~) . could render a. 
previous determinatio11 inconsistent with prevailing doctrine, 
and that 
"[i]f such a determination is then perpetuated each suc-
ceeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original 
litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment ditl('rent from• 
77-1134-0PINION 
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that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a 
result, there are inequalities in the administration of the 
revenue laws. discriminatory distinctions in tax liability. 
and a fertile basis for litigious confusion. [Collateral 
estoppel] is not meant to create vested rights in decisions 
that have become obsolete or erroneous with time. thereby 
causing inequities among taxpayers." Ibid. (citations 
omitted). 
No such considerations obtain here. The Government does 
not contend and the District Court did not find that a change 
in controlling legal principles had occurred between Kiewit I 
and the instant suit. That the Government's amended com-
plaint in this action replicates in substance the legal argument 
advanced by the contractor's complaint in Kiewit I further 
suggests the absence of any major doctrinal shifts since the 
Montana Supreme Court's decision.0 
Because the factual and legal context in which the issues 
of this case arise has not materially altered since Kiewit I, 
normal rules of preclusion should operate to relieve the parties 
of "redundant litigation [over] the identical question of the 
statute's application to the taxpayer's status." Tait v. U' est-
ern Maryland R . Co ., 289 r. S. 620. 624 (1933). See United 
States v. Russel Manufacturing Co., 349 F. 2d 13. 18-19 
(CA2 1965). 
c 
The sole remaining question is whether the particular 
circumstances of this case justify an exception to general 
principles of estoppel. Of possible relevance is the exception 
which obtains for "unmixed questions of law" in successive 
actions involving substantially unrelated claims. United 
States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236. 242 (1924) . As we recognized 
in Moser: 
"Where. for example. a court in deciding a case has 
7-r 9 See pp. ~supra. 
14 
77-1134-0PINIO~ 
MONTANA v. UNITED STATES 
enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequt'nt 
action upon a differe·nt demand arr not estopped from 
insisting that the law is otherwise. merely because the 
parti{'s are the same in both cases. But a fact, question 
or right distinctly adjudged in the origiual action cannot 
be disputed in a subsequent action. even though the 
determination was reached upon an . erroneous view or by 
an erroneous application of the law." Ibid. (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, when issues of law arise in successive actions involving 
unrelated subject matter. preclusion may be inappropriate. 
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments ~ 68.1. Reporter's 
Note. at 43-44 (Tent. Draft Xo . 4. Apr. 15. 1973); 1B Moore, 
supra, 1[ 0.448. at 4235; Scott. 56 Harv. L. Rev .. supra, at 10. 
This exception is of particular importance in constitutional 
adjudication. rnreftective invocation of collateral estoppel 
against parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional issues 
could freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness 
to changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical. To 
be sure. the scope of the Moser exception may be difficult to 
delineate. particularly whPre there is partial congruence in 
the subject mattt=>r of successive disputes. But the instant 
case poses no such conceptual difficulties. Rather. as the 
preceeding discussio11 indicates. the legal "demands" of this 
litigation are closely a1igned in time and subject matter to 
those in Kiewit I. 
Nor does this case implicate the right of a litigant who 
has "properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District 
Court to consider federal constitutional claims." and who is 
then "compelled. without his const>nt .... to accept a state 
court's determination of those claims.'' England v. Medical 
Examiners, 375 F. S. 411. 415 (1064) (footnote omittPtl). As 
we held in Engla·nd. abstention doctrine may not S<'I'V<' as a 
vehicle for depriving individuals of an otherwise cognizable 
right to have federal courts make factual determinations rs-
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!entia} to the resolution of federal questions. ld., at 417. 
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 427 (1963). However 
here, as in England, a party has "freely and without reserva-
tion submitte[d I his federal claims for decision by the state 
courts ... and ha [ d l them decided there. . .. " E ngla:nd 
v. Medical Examiners, supra, at 419. 111 Considerations of 
comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of 
issues in a federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has 
chosen to litigate thPm in state court. 
Finally. the Government has not alleged unfairness or 
iuadequacy in the state procedures to which it voluntarily 
submitted. 11 We must conclude therefore that it had a full 
and fair opportunity to pn•ss its constitutional challenges 111 
Kiewit I. 
111 The C:ovrrnment ~rt·b to distinguish England on the ground that the 
,., 14tc (' o: c tlllflt'lll r ' P~<>k•· to cij..;ting~~~fllmtf~-mHht•-grouud-+1~~-h~ 
l'ourt lwlow did not trchnicall~· abstain, but rathrr, at the Ilartip,.:' requrst, '~ 
continuc·d thr action "prnding rPsolution in the state Court.; of :\fontana .'' 
App. to .Juri,.:. StatPment -!~-50 . Furtlwr, in the Go\'ernmmt ';; virw . the 
rule of England ari,.:t':< onl~· when a part!/ frrely submits hi:; f<'ucral t'laims 
to adjudiration in :s tate court:; . HPcaust• tlw Unitrd States was not a. 
party in Kiewit I . thr Govrrnnwnt submits that it i,- not bound by the 
judgmt>nt in that cu~e. Brief of Fnit!'d States :34. 
Wr ngrrr that. the Di,;trict Court's action is properly characterized ns 
. -.. a rontinuunce and that re:; judicata . the doctrinr involwd in Eugland. is 
/ t:.. -(, '~napj11~-tu·li~;ti;~~~~~:~ .' · SePjlj~ s'Upra . But nPither point is 
~ availing ht>rc ~incr wt- dispost· of thr ca~e on grouncL~ of collateral t>:;toppel, 
which does apply to nonpartir:;, et>t• ibid .. and invoke England :;imply to 
dispel tmy infert>ncr that thr . :ame rt•;;ult would obtain if thr Federal 
Govermnrnt httd b<•t•n fon·t·d into state <·onrt and had resrrwd its federai 
rluim . 
11 Rt•dt'H•rmination of i::;:;up,; is wmTitntrd if then· is rra::;on to doubt the 
quality, rxtensivrn(•::;:;, or fairne:;s of procPdurr:; follow('(! in prior litigation. 
See Hr:;httrmt-nt. (Second) of .Judgments § UIU (c) (Trnt . Draft. Xu . 4 , 
Apr. 15, 19ii) ; 1'\ot<•, The PrPdusiv·c Eft'rl't of Stat!' .JudgPm(•nts on 
Sub;:equent. HJS:3 Actions, Ii-i Col. L . RP\'. 610, H-!0-65:~ (l~il\). C L 
'Gibsu11 \'. Berryhill, -!11 ('. S. ,)ti4 (19/:{): 1'rai'llor v. Herlll'lllllez. ,l:l{ 
U.S. 4:l4, -!ti9--!70, am[ u. !5 (19/i) (Sn:n:Ns, .J .• dj,.:. .:pnting). 
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Accordingly, the Government is estopped from seeking a 
contrary resolutiou of those issues here. The judgment of 
the District Court is 
Reversed. 
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Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMeERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
i'uprtmt <lfomt of tlft ~tb ~t~· 
-aslfittg~ !). Of. 2ll.;t~~ 
I 
January 22, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1134 Montana v. United States 
Dear r:rhurgood: 
At Conference in this case I voted to reverse on the 
merits of the constitutional issue, rather than col~teral 
estoppel7 I realize that a majority preferred to decide the 
issue of collateral estoppel, and you now have a Court for 
your op1n1on. Within a couple of days I anticipate circulating 
a short concurrence, not reaching the merits of the tax 
immunity claim, but expressing the idea that if we are to 
reverse on the basis of collateral estoppel (and I agree with 
the result you reach), we ought to do so without as much 
reliance on non-judicial materials as your opinion presently 
contains. I hope to have the concurrence in your hands by 
the latter part of this week. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
January 22, 1979 
No. 77-1134 Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your second draft of an opinion 
for the Court in this case, circulated January 19. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
·. 
' .. 
.jltJlrtnu <!feud ttf tqt ~b .ibdte 
'Dhtsfrington. ~. <!f. 2Dp,.~ 
CHAMISERS Of'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 23, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1134-Montana v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
I have considered carefully your letters of 
January 22. I think it self~evident that citations 
to the Restatement or scholarly articles are not 
intended to bind us on issues not presented on this 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
. t 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u:.prmu C!Jltlttf of t4t ~b ~taf:tg 
~lUlfrittghrn. ~. C!J. 2!l?J!.;l ' 
February 1, 1979 
Re: 77-1134 - Montana v. United States 
Dear Thurgood: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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